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A tale of two outsourcing contracts

dc.contributor.authorAubert, Benoit A.
dc.contributor.authorPatry, Michel
dc.contributor.authorRivard, Suzanne
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-16T08:50:47Z
dc.date.available2018-01-16T08:50:47Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.description.abstractThis study analyzes two extreme outsourcing situations. In the first case, contractual problems derailed the original agreement and precipitated a disastrous divorce. In the second case, the strategic alliance between the firm and its suppliers was supported by governance mechanisms that paved the way to a successful and harmonious relationship. Agency theory provides a conceptual background for analyzing the cases. Lessons are drawn from the experiences of the firms studied, and recommendations are made for the design of outsourcing contracts that curb contractual opportunism.
dc.identifier.pissn1861-8936
dc.identifier.urihttps://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/12348
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.ispartofWirtschaftsinformatik: Vol. 45, No. 2
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWirtschaftsinformatik
dc.subjectagency theory
dc.subjectincentive contracts
dc.subjectoutsourcing
dc.titleA tale of two outsourcing contracts
dc.typeText/Journal Article
gi.citation.endPage190
gi.citation.startPage181

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