Simulated annealing attack on certain fingerprint authentication systems
| dc.contributor.author | Pashalidis, Andreas | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Brömme, Arslan | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Busch, Christoph | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-10-31T12:34:05Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-10-31T12:34:05Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper describes a simple and generic attack against minutiae-based fingerprint authentication systems. The aim of the attack is to construct a fingerprint minutiae template, compliant to ISO/IEC standards, that matches a fixed but unknown target fingerprint. Our attack is expected to be most effective against systems that employ vicinity-based matching algorithms, i.e. systems that divide fingerprints into multiple regions and then compute similarity over these regions. The effectiveness of our attack is experimentally demonstrated against the recently proposed `Protected Minutiae Cylinder Code' (PMCC) scheme. | en |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-3-88579-606-0 | |
| dc.identifier.pissn | 1617-5468 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/17692 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | BIOSIG 2013 | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI) - Proceedings, Volume P-212 | |
| dc.title | Simulated annealing attack on certain fingerprint authentication systems | en |
| dc.type | Text/Conference Paper | |
| gi.citation.endPage | 73 | |
| gi.citation.publisherPlace | Bonn | |
| gi.citation.startPage | 63 | |
| gi.conference.date | 04.-06. September 2013 | |
| gi.conference.location | Darmstadt | |
| gi.conference.sessiontitle | Regular Research Papers |
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