

## Policy-based Access Control for the IoT and Smart Cities

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**Abstract:** The Internet of Things (IoT) can revolutionise the interaction between users and technology. This interaction generates sensitive and personal data. Therefore, access to the information they provide should be restricted to only authorised users. However, the limited storage and memory in IoT make it impractical to deploy traditional mechanisms to control access. In this paper, we propose a new access control mechanism based on trust policies adapted from LIGHT<sup>est</sup>. The proposed protocol also handles delegations in the IoT context elegantly. We provide the protocol overview and discuss its practical applications in the IoT environment.

**Keywords:** Trust Infrastructure; IoT; Smart City; Access Control; Trust Policy; LIGHT<sup>est</sup>

### 1 Introduction

The steady growth of the urban population puts existing urban infrastructure under considerable strain.

Around the globe, municipalities are turning towards the Internet of Things and its benefits in infrastructural resilience, improved city services, and management, environmental sustainability, and last but not least operational efficiency - or, in other words, cost reduction.

Many of these IoT applications are sensitive because they deal with personal data or critical public infrastructure. These present a target-rich environment for attackers.

Keeping the information above in mind, one relevant issue of smart cities arises: How can citizens securely access those benefits, without exposing them or the infrastructure to security and privacy threats? Typical home IoT standards are usually not applicable in the public domain. Therefore, publicly exposed mechanisms need to cope with this issue.

The LIGHT<sup>est</sup> project <sup>2</sup> aims to build a lightweight infrastructure easy and quick verification of electronic transactions. This paper answers the questions asked above using components from LIGHT<sup>est</sup>. The contributions of this paper are:

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<sup>2</sup> LIGHT<sup>est</sup> means Lightweight Infrastructure for Global Heterogeneous Trust management in support of an open Ecosystem of Stakeholders and Trust schemes.

- We introduce a policy-based access control model for public IoT services based on the LIGHT<sup>est</sup> project
- We adapt LIGHT<sup>est</sup> components such as delegations and trust policies and show their usage in IoT.

## 2 Current State of Access Control in the IoT and Smart Cities

IoT devices are inherently attractive targets to attackers because of the privacy-sensitive data they generate and their close interaction with critical infrastructure. Therefore, access to IoT devices and their resources should only be granted to verified identities that satisfy a specific set of access control rules.

One of the key means to secure and protect devices from those threats is access control. In subsequent paragraphs, we give an overview of the traditional access control mechanisms that were investigated for IoT.

**Access Control Matrix (ACM)** is a table that lists Subjects and Objects and defines which Subject can access which Object [AS17]. **ACM**, however, is known to suffer from scalability issues, as the size of this matrix can grow when applied to large-scale IoT systems. **ACM** was used as the basis for the design of two more access control mechanisms, namely (a) **Access Control Lists (ACL)** (b) **Capability-Based Access Control (CapBAC)**. **ACL** differs from **ACM** in representing the access control rights as linked lists for each object (resource), therefore eliminating the empty cells that would be present in **ACM**. However, the scalability of **ACL** is still a major issue, especially in resource-constrained devices.

In contrast with **ACL**, which is Object (Resource) oriented, **CapBAC** focuses on the Subject and uses the Capability Authorization Model. A capability is a communicable, unforgeable token of authority, and its possession by a subject grants the subject the access rights of the capability. One major issue is how to prevent an adversary from stealing the capability.

Another well-known access control paradigm is **Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)** [Sa97]. The basic idea of the **RBAC** model is that it lays its foundations on the user's role, rather than its identity (like **ACL** and **CapBAC**). With **RBAC**, multiple roles can be assigned per subject, and access rights can be defined for these roles. The scalability of the **RBAC** model is highly dependent on the roles being well-designed especially for IoT systems because systems can grow in size and complexity very quickly.

**ACL**, **CapBAC** and **RBAC** provide coarse-grained access rights that cannot consider other important factors in IoT systems, such as time and location. In pursuit of more fine-grained access control models, the **Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)** was developed. **ABAC** uses a set of attributes of objects, subjects, and environment to create access tokens. The approach is far more flexible and attractive for IoT systems when compared to the identity or role-centric models. On the other hand, choosing a proper set of attributes and

the computation complexity of access policies are some of the main challenges of the **ABAC** model.

### 3 The **LIGHT<sup>est</sup>** infrastructure

**LIGHT<sup>est</sup>** [BL16] aims to create a trust framework for cross-border verification. This trust framework leverages existing infrastructure to provide trust verification of electronic transactions across borders. One such infrastructure is the Domain Name System (DNS). DNS is a hierarchical naming system for devices connected to a network or the internet. DNS maps human-readable domain names to IP addresses. Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is a suite of protocols that provides origin authentication of DNS data, authenticated denial of existence, and data integrity to the underlying DNS protocol.

**LIGHT<sup>est</sup>** uses the DNSSEC root key [HS12] as the global trust anchor. All trust decisions made with **LIGHT<sup>est</sup>** can be traced back to this trust anchor. The **LIGHT<sup>est</sup>** infrastructure consists of the following components; Trust Scheme Publication Authority (TSPA), Trust Translation Authority (TTA), and a Delegation Provider (DP); and an Automated Trust Verifier (ATV).

In general, someone provides a transaction to the ATV for verification. The transaction is usually signed by the creator<sup>3</sup> of the transaction. The ATV verifies that the transaction is signed correctly and then proceeds to verify to which trust scheme the transaction belongs<sup>4</sup>. In a situation where a verifier uses a different trust scheme from the transaction, the TTA provides translations from one trust scheme to another. ATV can query the TTA for an equivalent trust scheme and use the translation for verification. The DP provides the validity information and revocation status of a delegation to the ATV if a delegation is involved [WOM17].

The whole process listed above is configured according to the verifier's specific needs with the use of a trust policy [MS18].

### 4 Approach: On-device authorisation

We propose an approach where an ATV component is running directly on a device is performing access control decisions based on trust policies. The trust policy is stored securely<sup>5</sup> in the IoT device. This secure storage of trust policies enables complex use-cases and scenarios by providing all the features that the **LIGHT<sup>est</sup>** architecture supports.

<sup>3</sup> The creator of the transaction signs the transaction with his signing certificate's private key.

<sup>4</sup> This means that the ATV checks under which trust scheme the certificate that signed the transaction belongs and thereby attributes the transaction to that trust scheme.

<sup>5</sup> The owner of the IoT device can use any secure means of storage available

Trust policies are rules written in a machine-readable language (in this case, the Trust Policy Language) that describe conditions for certain actions. For example, a trust policy for access control can restrict the access to a certain person or group of people - therefore requiring certain identities. Trust policies can formulate generic rules, e.g., based on context, location, and time.

Furthermore, trust policies can take the readings of sensors into account. It is, therefore, possible to grant or deny access based on a complex set of rules. This proposed access control makes it easy to grant another person access the IoT device on behalf of the original device owner (or administrator). This empowerment is called delegation and this is an integral part of this approach.

#### 4.1 Protocol Overview

This subsection explains the verification process for a client requesting access to an IoT device. We assume that there is an Access-Request client on the user’s device that can generate the necessary Access-Request. We also assume that the IoT device is running the Automatic Trust Verifier. The mode of communication between the Access-Request client and the Automatic Trust Verifier on the IoT device can vary depending on the desires of the user. We outline protocol steps as shown in Figure 1:




Fig. 1: Protocol Overview.

- Step 1-2** The user creates an access request using an Access-Request client on any device of its choice and signs it with its key ID. The key ID is usually the private key of its key

pair or any other form of well-known IDs. The user sends this access request to the IoT device using any means of its choice.

2. **Step 3-6** On receiving the access request, the IoT device starts a challenge-response protocol (any secure, lightweight challenge-response protocol can be used at this stage) and determines if the user still holds the key pair.
3. **Step 7** Once the IoT device confirms that the user requesting access is in possession of the ID, the IoT device sends the access request to the Automatic Trust Verifier.
4. **Step 8-10** The Automatic Trust Verifier on the IoT device verifies that the access request fulfils the Trust Policy stored on the IoT device and if a delegation is available, it verifies if the delegation is valid and whether it conforms to the trust policy, too.

## 4.2 Verification Process on IoT Device

The Verification process on the IoT device begins when the Automatic Trust Verifier (ATV) on the IoT device verifies that the Access-Request is properly signed. After this is verified, the ATV extracts the ID <sup>6</sup>, Command and Delegation. The next step is to verify the ID alongside with the delegation. The ID is checked for validity, but the process varies depending on the kind of ID. If a delegation exists, the ATV verifies the revocation status of the delegation which is stapled (added) to the delegation itself. Once the revocation status is checked, and the delegation is still valid, the verification proceeds and the ATV checks the resource that the identity can access. The restrictions on resources are provided by the Trust Policy which is stored on the IoT device. If the Access-Request Command section conforms to the allowable resources as specified by the Trust Policy, access is granted.

### 4.2.1 Access-Request Format

The Access-Request consists of two main parts and an optional section: namely the ID section, the Command section, and delegation section. The ID section contains the Public key of the resource requester. The key is the counterpart of the Private key used to sign the Access-Request. This ID section can also contain any form of ID that the resource requester uses. The Command section lists the resources that the user wants to access. If the IoT device does not have multiple resources or the specific levels of access are not defined in the Trust Policy, the Command section is ignored. This Command section gives the owner of the IoT device fine-grained control of the resources on the device.

The delegation section carries the delegation information that the owner of the device assigned to the resource requester. This section could be non-existent in some cases where delegation is not necessary. The delegation information contains information about resources the access requester can delegate to another or use to access the resources.

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<sup>6</sup> The ID embedded into the access request is the public key of the private key that created the access request.

### 4.2.2 Delegation Format

Delegations occur when an entity, i.e., a mandator, gives another entity, i.e., a proxy, the authority to act on its behalf. Different data formats exist for delegations. This delegation data format is based on the structure presented in [WOM17].

The detailed description of the fields is described in [WOM17]. The most notable part of the representation is the *actions/domain* field. This field describes the allowed action(s) that have been delegated to the user creating the access request. The resource requester needs to add the delegation that it was given to the access request. From Figure ?? we can easily construct the correct data structure with the same field names.

### 4.3 Protocol Considerations

Unlike the access control models based on identity alone (**ACL**, **CapBAC**) or roles (**RBAC**), the policy-based access control mechanism provides more fine-grained control because policies can be written to grant or deny rights based on the identity, the role of a subject and other unique conditions such as the environmental or internal conditions.

The policy-based access control is also scalable since a single policy can be written and deployed on several IoT devices and executes a different set of rules depending on the environmental and internal variables of each IoT device.

**ABAC** is the closest approach to the policy-based access control proposed in this paper but differs in the scalability since different IoT devices on a common network will need different configurations while in the proposed policy-based access control, a single policy can execute differently on different IoT devices depending on the device conditions.

A major constraint of our approach is the fact that the IoT device must have enough storage and computational resources to run the ATV. Besides, we assume that the IoT device is connected to the Internet. The IoT device needs the Internet to query the external components such as Delegation Provider.

## 5 Conclusion and Future Work

This paper proposed a policy-based access control mechanism that is based on concepts from the  $\text{LIGHT}^{est}$  project.  $\text{LIGHT}^{est}$  aims to make trust verification of electronic transactions easier while also leveraging existing infrastructure such as the DNS (Domain Name System). The access control mechanism proposed in this paper allows fine-grained control on the IoT resources. The fine-grained control is reflected in its ability to express complex access control rules via TPL and handle delegations.

As part of future work, the ATV will be moved away from the IoT device to an independent system that the IoT device can query. This results in trust verification as a service and frees the IoT device from running an ATV, which frees more computation power and resources from the device. These freed resources can be used for other tasks.

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