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Auflistung nach Autor:in "Fischlin, Marc"

1 - 5 von 5
  • Abstract
    BUFFing signature schemes beyond unforgeability and the case of post-quantum signatures
    (crypto day matters 32, 2021) Cremers, Cas; Düzlü, Samed; Fiedler, Rune; Fischlin, Marc; Janson, Christian
  • Zeitschriftenartikel
    Hintertüren und Schwächen im kryptographischen Standard SP 800-90A
    (Computeralgebra-Rundbrief: Vol. 55, 2014) Fischlin, Marc
  • Konferenzbeitrag
    Merging the cryptographic security analysis and the algebraic-logic security proof of PACE
    (SICHERHEIT 2012 – Sicherheit, Schutz und Zuverlässigkeit, 2012) Cheikhrouhou, Lassaad; Stephan, Werner; Dagdelen, Özgür; Fischlin, Marc; Ullmann, Markus
    In this paper we report on recent results about the merge of the cryptographic security proof for the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), used within the German identity cards, with the algebraic-logic symbolic proof for the same protocol. Both proofs have initially been carried out individually, but have now been combined to get “the best of both worlds”: an automated, errorresistant analysis with strong cryptographic security guarantees.
  • Konferenzbeitrag
    Sanitizable signatures: how to partially delegate control for authenticated data
    (BIOSIG 2009: biometrics and electronic signatures, 2009) Brzuska, Christina; Fischlin, Marc; Lehmann, Anja; Schröder, Dominique
    Sanitizable signatures have been introduced by Ateniese et al. (ESORICS 2005) and allow an authorized party, the sanitizer, to modify a predetermined part of a signed message without invalidating the signature. Brzuska et al. (PKC 2009) gave the first comprehensive formal treatment of the five security properties for such schemes. These are unforgeability, immutability, privacy, transparency and accountability. They also provide a modification of the sanitizable signature scheme proposed by Ateniese et al. such that it provably satisfies all security requirement. Unfortunately, their scheme comes with rather large signature sizes and produces computational overhead that increases with the number of admissible modifications. In this paper we show that by sacrificing the transparency property - thus allowing to distinguish whether a message has been sanitized or notwe can obtain a sanitizable signature scheme that is still provably secure concerning the other aforementioned properties but significantly more efficient. We propose a construction that is based solely on regular signature schemes, produces short signatures and only adds a small computational overhead.
  • Konferenzbeitrag
    TLS, PACE, and EAC: a cryptographic view at modern key exchange protocols
    (SICHERHEIT 2012 – Sicherheit, Schutz und Zuverlässigkeit, 2012) Brzuska, Christina; Dagdelen, Özgür; Fischlin, Marc
    To establish a secure channel between two parties common security solutions often use a key exchange protocol as a preliminary subroutine to generate a shared key. These solutions include the protocols for secure communication between a reader and an identity card or passport, called PACE and EAC, and the TLS protocol for secure web communication. In this work we survey the cryptographic status of these protocols and the recent developments in this area.