Logo des Repositoriums

Auflistung nach Autor:in "Hermans, Jens"

1 - 3 von 3
  • Konferenzbeitrag
    Shattering the glass maze
    (BIOSIG 2014, 2014) Hermans, Jens; Peeters, Roel; Mennink, Bart
    Template protection plays a crucial role in protecting the privacy of biometric data, by providing irreversibility and unlinkability. The Glass Maze, as presented by Trugenberger at BIOSIG 2011, is a fingerprint key binding mechanism that is claimed to provide template protection. With the correct fingerprint, the key that is entangled with the fingerprint data can be retrieved. The template protection of the Glass Maze is based on the convergence properties of a Hopfield model, a neural network. We however show how to revert the Glass Maze to recover the key, without requiring a correct fingerprint. This completely breaks the irreversibility property, and hence also unlinkability.
  • Konferenzbeitrag
    Speedup for European epassport authentication
    (BIOSIG 2014, 2014) Peeters, Roel; Hermans, Jens; Mennink, Bart
    The overall ePassport authentication procedure should be fast to have a sufficient throughput of people at border crossings such as airports. At the same time, the ePassport and its holder should be checked as thoroughly as possible. By speeding up the ePassport authentication procedure, more time can be spend on verification of biometrics. We demonstrate that our proposed solution allows to replace the current combination of PACE and EAC with a more efficient authentication procedure that provides even better security and privacy guarantees. When abstracting away from the time needed for the ePassport to verify the terminal's certificate, a speed-up of at least 40\% in comparison with the current ePassport authentication procedure is to be expected.
  • Konferenzbeitrag
    When a bloom filter is a doom filter: security assessment of a novel iris biometric template protection system
    (BIOSIG 2014, 2014) Hermans, Jens; Mennink, Bart; Peeters, Roel
    Biometric template protection systems are expected to meet two major security requirements: irreversibility and unlinkability. We analyze the Bloom filter based iris biometric template protection system recently introduced by Rathgeb et al. at ICB 2013 and IET Biometrics 2014. We demonstrate that the scheme does not achieve unlinkability, presenting a simple attack that in the worst case succeeds with probability at least 96\%. We also present a security analysis on generating false positives or recovering the key, both leading to undesirably low attack complexities: 225 for generating false positives for the smaller versions of the scheme, and a complexity between 22 and 28 for recovering the secret key.