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Auflistung nach Autor:in "Teschner, Florian"

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  • Zeitschriftenartikel
    Beware of Performance Indicators
    (Business & Information Systems Engineering: Vol. 57, No. 6, 2015) Kranz, Tobias T.; Teschner, Florian; Weinhardt, Christof
    Online trading interfaces are important instruments for retail investors. For sound reasons, regulators obligate online brokers to inform customers about certain trade related risks. Research has shown that different behavioral biases can decrease traders’ performance and hence lead to pecuniary losses. The disposition to hold losing stocks too long and sell winning stocks too early (‘disposition effect’) is such a deviation from rational behavior. The disposition effect is analyzed for the prediction market ‘Kurspiloten’ which predicts selected stock prices and counts nearly 2000 active traders and more than 200,000 orders. We show that the disposition effect can be aggravated by visual feedback on a trader’s performance via colored trend direction arrows and percentages. However, we find no evidence that such an interface modification leads to higher activity. Furthermore, we can not confirm that creating awareness of the disposition effect with textual information is suited to decreasing its strength.
  • Konferenzbeitrag
    Decision behavior and performance in mobile trading applications
    (MMS 2012: Mobile und Ubiquitäre Informationssysteme, 2012) Teschner, Florian; Kranz, Tobias T.; Weinhardt, Christof
    A common belief about decision making is that the more information we process the better our decisions. Increasingly, we rely on (mobile) information systems to filter, aggregate and present information in order to make it easier to process. With the rise of mobile IS the question arises how decision behavior differs compared to stationary settings. In this paper we analyze user actions in a repeated market environment. We conduct a field experiment in which participants can choose stationary and/or mobile access. Exhaustingly recording all user actions we can compare user performance depending on the device. We are able to distinguish between decision accuracy and behavior in a market environment and thereby provide insight into the interplay between interface, information and decision making.
  • Zeitschriftenartikel
    How (not) to Incent Crowd Workers
    (Business & Information Systems Engineering: Vol. 57, No. 3, 2015) Straub, Tim; Gimpel, Henner; Teschner, Florian; Weinhardt, Christof
    Crowdsourcing gains momentum: In digital work places such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, oDesk, Clickworker, 99designs, or InnoCentive it is easy to distribute human work to hundreds or thousands of freelancers. In these crowdsourcing settings, one challenge is to properly incent worker effort to create value. Common incentive schemes are piece rate payments and rank-order tournaments among workers. Tournaments might or might not disclose a worker’s current competitive position via a leaderboard. Following an exploratory approach, we derive a model on worker performance in rank-order tournaments and present a series of real effort studies using experimental techniques on an online labor market to test the model and to compare dyadic tournaments to piece rate payments. Data suggests that on average dyadic tournaments do not improve performance compared to a simple piece rate for simple and short crowdsourcing tasks. Furthermore, giving feedback on the competitive position in such tournaments tends to be negatively related to workers’ performance. This relation is partially mediated by task completion and moderated by the provision of feedback: When playing against strong competitors, feedback is associated with workers quitting the task altogether and, thus, showing lower performance. When the competitors are weak, workers tend to complete the task but with reduced effort. Overall, individual piece rate payments are most simple to communicate and implement while incenting performance is on par with more complex dyadic tournaments.