Logo des Repositoriums

Auflistung nach Schlagwort "Incentives"

1 - 3 von 3
  • Zeitschriftenartikel
    “Get a Free Item Pack with Every Activation!” - Do Incentives Increase the Adoption Rates of Two-Factor Authentication?
    (i-com: Vol. 18, No. 3, 2019) Busse, Karoline; Amft, Sabrina; Hecker, Daniel; von Zezschwitz, Emanuel
    Account security is an ongoing issue in practice. Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) is a mechanism which could help mitigate this problem, however adoption is not very high in most domains. Online gaming has adopted an interesting approach to drive adoption: Games offer small rewards such as visual modifications to the player’s avatar’s appearance, if players utilize 2FA. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of these incentives and investigate how they can be applied to non-gaming contexts. We conducted two surveys, one recruiting gamers and one recruiting from a general population. In addition, we conducted three focus group interviews to evaluate various incentive designs for both, the gaming context and the non-gaming context. We found that visual modifications, which are the most popular type of gaming-related incentives, are not as popular in non-gaming contexts. However, our design explorations indicate that well-chosen incentives have the potential to lead to more users adopting 2FA, even outside of the gaming context.
  • Zeitschriftenartikel
    How (not) to Incent Crowd Workers
    (Business & Information Systems Engineering: Vol. 57, No. 3, 2015) Straub, Tim; Gimpel, Henner; Teschner, Florian; Weinhardt, Christof
    Crowdsourcing gains momentum: In digital work places such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, oDesk, Clickworker, 99designs, or InnoCentive it is easy to distribute human work to hundreds or thousands of freelancers. In these crowdsourcing settings, one challenge is to properly incent worker effort to create value. Common incentive schemes are piece rate payments and rank-order tournaments among workers. Tournaments might or might not disclose a worker’s current competitive position via a leaderboard. Following an exploratory approach, we derive a model on worker performance in rank-order tournaments and present a series of real effort studies using experimental techniques on an online labor market to test the model and to compare dyadic tournaments to piece rate payments. Data suggests that on average dyadic tournaments do not improve performance compared to a simple piece rate for simple and short crowdsourcing tasks. Furthermore, giving feedback on the competitive position in such tournaments tends to be negatively related to workers’ performance. This relation is partially mediated by task completion and moderated by the provision of feedback: When playing against strong competitors, feedback is associated with workers quitting the task altogether and, thus, showing lower performance. When the competitors are weak, workers tend to complete the task but with reduced effort. Overall, individual piece rate payments are most simple to communicate and implement while incenting performance is on par with more complex dyadic tournaments.
  • Zeitschriftenartikel
    Unternehmensweite Anwendungs-integration — Zentrale Anreizsetzung zur Realisierung von Netzwerkeffekten bei dezentralen Entscheidungsstrukturen
    (Wirtschaftsinformatik: Vol. 48, No. 3, 2006) Heinrich, Bernd; Klier, Mathias; Bewernik, Marc-Andre
    Kernpunkte⊎ Entscheiden einzelne Geschäftsbereiche dezentral über die Einführung einer Middleware (MW), so kommt es oftmals nicht zu einer aus Sicht der Gesamtunternehmung optimalen Lösung. In der Praxis ist dieses Problem durch rein dezentrale Abstimmungsprozesse erfahrungsgemäß nicht oder nur sehr schwierig zu lösen. Hier können zentrale Stellen, wie bspw. die Architekturabteilung, durch Koordination und Anreizsetzung in Form eines finanziellen Ausgleichs zur Lösung beitragen.⊎ Mit Hilfe eines im Beitrag entwickelten Algorithmus kann unter Berücksichtigung wichtiger Aspekte-wie z.B. der zeitlichen Sequenzialität dezentraler MW-Entscheidungen oder den zukünftigen Veränderungen der Anwendungslandschaft (bspw. infolge Outsourcing)-die auszahlungsminimale Anreizsetzung sowie die zugehörige Reihenfolge der MW-Umstellungen ermittelt werden. Einige der Investitionshemmnisse, die bei dezentraler Entscheidungsfindung auftreten, können so überwunden und die sich durch die Standardisierung ergebenden Netzwerkeffekte realisiert werden.AbstractThis article deals with several issues arising from decentralized decision making in the field of enterprise application integration. At present many enterprises cannot establish the optimal middleware solution due to differing local interests. To solve this problem, the article focuses on centralized coordination using incentives to realise network effects and develops an optimisation-algorithm, determining the payoff-minimal incentives paid by a central architecture unit. The developed algorithm uses the segment-, application-, interface-and cost structures — based on documented information — as input. Finally, a case study conducted in the financial services industry illustrates both the developed algorithm and the corresponding results.