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Auflistung nach Schlagwort "computational social choice"

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  • Konferenzbeitrag
    Applying Voting Methods in User Research
    (Mensch und Computer 2019 - Tagungsband, 2019) Sageder, Julia; Demleitner, Ariane; Irlbacher, Oliver; Wimmer, Raphael
    In usability practice, it is often necessary to find a 'best' solution that is most suitable for most users. A common way to do this is to present multiple alternatives to a group of users and let them express their preferences. However, integrating many subjective ratings into one generally valid rating is non-trivial. For such data, voting methods from the field of *computational social choice* might prove useful. In order to investigate their suitability, we conducted an experiment where participants had to complete a pointing task using four different mouse acceleration values and rank the perceived performance of each option via Likert-type items and also by ranking them. For generating an overall ranking, we calculated arithmetic mean and median as well as Borda count and Schulze method for each of the response sets. All methods resulted in nearly the same overall ranking of options which suggests that they might be equally useful for generating consensus on a 'best' option.
  • Konferenzbeitrag
    Possible Voter Control in k-Approval and k-Veto Under Partial Information
    (Datenbanksysteme für Business, Technologie und Web (BTW 2017) - Workshopband, 2017) Erdélyi, Gábor; Reger, Christian
    We study the complexity of possible constructive/destructive control by adding voters (PCCAV/PDCAV) and deleting voters (PCCDV/PDCDV) under nine different models of partial information for k-Approval and k-Veto. For the two destructive variants, we can further settle a polynomial-time result holding even for each scoring rule. Generally, in voter control, an external agent (called the chair) tries to change the outcome of the election by adding new voters to the elec- tion or by deleting voters from the election. Usually there is full information in voting theory, i.e., the chair knows the candidates, each voter’s complete ranking about the candidates and the voting rule used. In this paper, we assume the chair to have partial information about the votes and ask if the chair can add (delete) some votes so that his preferred (despised) candidate is (not) a winner for at least one completion of the partial votes to complete votes.