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Auflistung nach Schlagwort "e-voting"

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  • Textdokument
    Identifying Factors Studied for Voter Trust in E-Voting - Review of Literature
    (E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Erb, Yannick; Duenas-Cid, David; Volkamer, Melanie
    Trust is a precondition for the adoption of novel technologies (see, e.g., Ehin et. al.). As more and more electoral commissions consider introducing e-voting solutions, research into voter trust in these systems grows in importance. As a basis for future research on trust in e-voting, we conducted a literature review. We identified 13 papers researching various factors influencing voters' trust in e-voting. In these papers, we determined a total of 64 potential factors, while the direction of their influence on voter trust may be either positive, negative, or both (positive/negative). These factors were subsequently systemized into five categories, ranging from socio-political to technology-related factors. These are then described and discussed. We also find shortcomings in the current empirical research on voter trust and propose directions for future research in order to address these.
  • Textdokument
    Linearly-Homomorphic Signatures for Short Randomizable Proofs of Subset Membership
    (E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Pointcheval, David
    Electronic voting is one of the most interesting application of modern cryptography, as it involves many innovative tools (such as homomorphic public-key encryption, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and distributed cryptography) to guarantee several a priori contradictory security properties: the integrity of the tally and the privacy of the individual votes. While many efficient solutions exist for honest-but-curious voters, that follow the official procedure but try to learn more than just the public result, preventing attacks from malicious voters is much more complex: when voters may have incentive to send biased ballots, the privacy of the ballots is much harder to satisfy, whereas this is the crucial security property for electronic voting. We present a new technique to prove that an ElGamal ciphertext contains a message from a specific subset (quasi-adaptive NIZK of subset membership), using linearly-homomorphic signatures. The proofs are both quite efficient to generate, allowing the use of low-power devices to vote, and randomizable, which is important for the strong receipt-freeness property. They are well-suited to prevent vote-selling and replay attacks, which are the main threats against the privacy in electronic voting, with security proofs in the generic group model and the random oracle model.