Evaluation of (power) side-channels in cryptographic implementations
| dc.contributor.author | Bache, Florian | |
| dc.contributor.author | Plump, Christina | |
| dc.contributor.author | Wloka, Jonas | |
| dc.contributor.author | Güneysu, Tim | |
| dc.contributor.author | Drechsler, Rolf | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-21T12:12:26Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-06-21T12:12:26Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Side-channel attacks enable powerful adversarial strategies against cryptographic devices and encounter an ever-growing attack surface in today’s world of digitalization and the internet of things. While the employment of provably secure side-channel countermeasures like masking have become increasingly popular in recent years, great care must be taken when implementing these in actual devices. The reasons for this are two-fold: The models on which these countermeasures rely do not fully capture the physical reality and compliance with the requirements of the countermeasures is non-trivial in complex implementations. Therefore, it is imperative to validate the SCA-security of concrete instantiations of cryptographic devices using measurements on the actual device. In this article we propose a side-channel evaluation framework that combines an efficient data acquisition process with state-of-the-art confidence interval based leakage assessment. Our approach allows a sound assessment of the potential susceptibility of cryptographic implementations to side-channel attacks and is robust against noise in the evaluation system. We illustrate the steps in the evaluation process by applying them to a protected implementation of AES. | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1515/itit-2018-0028 | |
| dc.identifier.pissn | 2196-7032 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/36636 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | De Gruyter | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | it - Information Technology: Vol. 61, No. 1 | |
| dc.subject | TVLA | |
| dc.subject | Side-Channel Attacks | |
| dc.subject | DPA | |
| dc.title | Evaluation of (power) side-channels in cryptographic implementations | en |
| dc.type | Text/Journal Article | |
| gi.citation.endPage | 28 | |
| gi.citation.publisherPlace | Berlin | |
| gi.citation.startPage | 15 |