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Simulated annealing attack on certain fingerprint authentication systems

dc.contributor.authorPashalidis, Andreas
dc.contributor.editorBrömme, Arslan
dc.contributor.editorBusch, Christoph
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-31T12:34:05Z
dc.date.available2018-10-31T12:34:05Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractThis paper describes a simple and generic attack against minutiae-based fingerprint authentication systems. The aim of the attack is to construct a fingerprint minutiae template, compliant to ISO/IEC standards, that matches a fixed but unknown target fingerprint. Our attack is expected to be most effective against systems that employ vicinity-based matching algorithms, i.e. systems that divide fingerprints into multiple regions and then compute similarity over these regions. The effectiveness of our attack is experimentally demonstrated against the recently proposed `Protected Minutiae Cylinder Code' (PMCC) scheme.en
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-88579-606-0
dc.identifier.pissn1617-5468
dc.identifier.urihttps://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/17692
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherGesellschaft für Informatik e.V.
dc.relation.ispartofBIOSIG 2013
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLecture Notes in Informatics (LNI) - Proceedings, Volume P-212
dc.titleSimulated annealing attack on certain fingerprint authentication systemsen
dc.typeText/Conference Paper
gi.citation.endPage73
gi.citation.publisherPlaceBonn
gi.citation.startPage63
gi.conference.date04.-06. September 2013
gi.conference.locationDarmstadt
gi.conference.sessiontitleRegular Research Papers

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