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Sharing is Caring: Towards Analyzing Attack Surfaces on Shared Hosting Providers

dc.contributor.authorHörnemann, Jan
dc.contributor.authorPohlmann, Norbert
dc.contributor.authorUrban, Tobias
dc.contributor.authorGroße-Kampmann, Matteo
dc.contributor.editorWendzel, Steffen
dc.contributor.editorWressnegger, Christian
dc.contributor.editorHartmann, Laura
dc.contributor.editorFreiling, Felix
dc.contributor.editorArmknecht, Frederik
dc.contributor.editorReinfelder, Lena
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-19T12:54:02Z
dc.date.available2024-04-19T12:54:02Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we shed light on shared hosting services’ security and trust implications and measure their attack surfaces. To do so, we analyzed 30 shared hosters and found that all of them might leak relevant information, which could be abused unnoticed. An adversary could use this attack surface to covertly extract data from various third parties registered with a shared hoster. Furthermore, we found that most hosters suffer from vulnerabilities that can be used by an internal attacker (i.e., someone using the service) to compromise other hosted services or the entire system.en
dc.identifier.doi10.18420/sicherheit2024_014
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-88579-739-5
dc.identifier.pissn1617-5468
dc.identifier.urihttps://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/43954
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherGesellschaft für Informatik e.V.
dc.relation.ispartofSicherheit 2024
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLecture Notes in Informatics (LNI) - Proceedings Volume P-345
dc.titleSharing is Caring: Towards Analyzing Attack Surfaces on Shared Hosting Providersen
dc.typeText/Conference Paper
gi.citation.endPage229
gi.citation.publisherPlaceBonn
gi.citation.startPage217
gi.conference.date09.-11.04.2024
gi.conference.locationWorms
gi.conference.sessiontitleFull Paper Session 7 – Netzwerk- und Softwaresicherheit

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