Linearly-Homomorphic Signatures for Short Randomizable Proofs of Subset Membership
| dc.contributor.author | Pointcheval, David | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Volkamer, Melanie | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Duenas-Cid, David | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Rønne, Peter B. | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Ryan, Peter Y A | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Budurushi, Jurlind | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Kulyk, Oksana | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Rodriguez Pérez, Adrià | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Spycher-Krivonosova, Iuliia | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Kirsten, Michael | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Debant, Alexandre | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Goodman, Nicole | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-12-13T09:05:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-12-13T09:05:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Electronic voting is one of the most interesting application of modern cryptography, as it involves many innovative tools (such as homomorphic public-key encryption, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and distributed cryptography) to guarantee several a priori contradictory security properties: the integrity of the tally and the privacy of the individual votes. While many efficient solutions exist for honest-but-curious voters, that follow the official procedure but try to learn more than just the public result, preventing attacks from malicious voters is much more complex: when voters may have incentive to send biased ballots, the privacy of the ballots is much harder to satisfy, whereas this is the crucial security property for electronic voting. We present a new technique to prove that an ElGamal ciphertext contains a message from a specific subset (quasi-adaptive NIZK of subset membership), using linearly-homomorphic signatures. The proofs are both quite efficient to generate, allowing the use of low-power devices to vote, and randomizable, which is important for the strong receipt-freeness property. They are well-suited to prevent vote-selling and replay attacks, which are the main threats against the privacy in electronic voting, with security proofs in the generic group model and the random oracle model. | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.18420/e-vote-id2023_01 | |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-3-88579-741-8 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1617-5468 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/45431 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Gesellschaft für Informatik, Bonn | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | E-Vote-ID 2023 | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI) - Proceedings, Volume P-347 | |
| dc.subject | e-voting | |
| dc.subject | non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs | |
| dc.title | Linearly-Homomorphic Signatures for Short Randomizable Proofs of Subset Membership | en |
| mci.conference.date | 3.-6. October 2023 | |
| mci.conference.location | Luxembourg | |
| mci.conference.sessiontitle | Track 1: Security, Usability and Technical Issues | |
| mci.reference.pages | 19-37 |
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