Security-Induced Lock-In in the Cloud
dc.contributor.author | Arce, Daniel | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-11-04T08:34:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-11-04T08:34:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
dc.description.abstract | Cloud services providers practice security-induced lock-in when employing cryptography and tamper-resistance to limit the portability and interoperability of users’ data and applications. Moreover, security-induced lock-in and users’ anti-lock-in strategies intersect within the context of platform competition. When users deploy anti-lock in strategies, such as using a hybrid cloud, a leader–follower pricing framework increases profits for cloud services providers relative to Nash equilibrium prices. This creates a second-mover advantage, as the follower’s increase in profits exceeds that of the leader owing to the potential for price undercutting. By contrast, introducing or enhancing security-induced lock-in creates both an increase in profits and a first-mover advantage. Cloud services providers therefore favor security-induced lock-in over price leadership. More broadly, we show why standardization of semantics, technologies, and interfaces is a nonstarter for cloud services providers. | de |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s12599-021-00729-5 | |
dc.identifier.pissn | 1867-0202 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12599-021-00729-5 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/39728 | |
dc.publisher | Springer | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Business & Information Systems Engineering: Vol. 64, No. 4 | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Business & Information Systems Engineering | |
dc.subject | Anti-lock-in strategies | |
dc.subject | Cloud services providers | |
dc.subject | Cybersecurity | |
dc.subject | Lock-in | |
dc.subject | Platform economics | |
dc.subject | Switching costs | |
dc.title | Security-Induced Lock-In in the Cloud | de |
dc.type | Text/Journal Article | |
gi.citation.endPage | 513 | |
gi.citation.startPage | 501 |