

Sensors for Detection of Misbehaving Nodes in MANETs

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Abstract: The fact that security is a critical problem when implementing mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) is widely acknowledged. One of the different kinds of misbehavior a node may exhibit is selfishness. A selfish node wants to preserve its resources while using the services of others and consuming their resources. One way of preventing selfishness in a MANET is a detection and exclusion mechanism. In this paper, we focus on the detection and present different kinds of sensors that will find selfish nodes. First we present simulations that show the negative effects which selfish nodes cause in MANET. In the related work section we will analyze the detection mechanisms proposed by others. Our new detection mechanisms that we describe in this paper are called *activity-based overhearing*, *iterative probing*, and *unambiguous probing*. Simulation-based analysis of these mechanisms show that they are highly effective and can reliably detect a multitude of selfish behaviors.

1 Selfish nodes in MANETs

Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) rely on the cooperation of all participating nodes. The more nodes cooperate to transfer traffic, the more powerful a MANET gets. But supporting a MANET is a cost-intensive activity for a mobile node. Detecting routes and forwarding packets consumes local CPU time, memory, network-bandwidth, and last but not least energy. Therefore there is a strong motivation for a node to deny packet forwarding to others while at the same time using their services to deliver own data.

In table 1, we analyze different possibilities for a selfish node to save its own resources in a MANET based on the DSR routing protocol [JMJJ03, Pe01]. It uses the attack-tree notation proposed by Bruce Schneier [Sc99] that allows the analysis of different ways how an attacker can achieve his goal. Alternatives to reach a certain goal are denoted by OR, multiple steps that are necessary to reach a goal are denoted by AND. Using the numbers in the table, we can easily describe different attacks. For example, attack 3.1 stands for "Drop data packets".

Whereas most of the attacks based on manipulations of routing data can be detected by the use of a secure routing protocol like Ariadne [HPJ02], SRP [PH02a, PH02b, PH02c, PHS02, PH03], ARAN [SDL⁺02], or SAODV [Gu02, GA02], there remain two attacks in the attack tree that cannot be detected this easily. When nodes simply drop packets (case 1.1 and 3.1 in the attack tree), all of the secure routing protocols fail as they focus only on

Attack tree: Save own resources	
OR	1. Do not participate in routing
	OR 1. Do not relay routing data
	OR 1. Do not relay route requests
	2. Do not relay route replies
	3. Set hop limit or TTL value in route request/reply to smallest possible value
	2. Modify routing data/topology
	OR 1. Modify route request
	OR 1. Insert additional hops
	2. Modify route reply
	OR 1. Replace own ID in returned route with detour leading through neighboring nodes
	2. Return completely wrong route, provoking RERR and salvaging
	3. Insert additional hops
	4. Declare own ID in source route as external
	2. Stop participation in current route
AND	1. Provoke route error
	OR 1. Create arbitrary RERR messages
	2. Do not send ACK messages (causing RERRs in other nodes)
	2. Do not participate in following route request (A.1)
	3. Do not relay data packets
OR	1. Drop data packets
	2. Set hop limit/TTL to 0/1 (causing a RERR)

Table 1: Attack Tree: Save own resources

Parameter	Value
Number of Nodes	50
Area X (m)	1500
Area Y (m)	300
Transmission Range Radius (m)	250
Traffic Model	cbr
Sending rate (packets/s)	4.0
Max. number of connections	20
Packet size (byte)	512
Simulation time (s)	900

Table 2: Simulation parameters

the detection of modifications to routing data but not on the concealment of existing links. We have done a number of simulations that show how this behavior affects a MANET. The simulations were done using ns-2.1b8a and the DSR routing protocol. The scenario included 50 nodes moving in an area of 1500x300m according to the random waypoint model at speeds of $1 \frac{m}{s}$ and $20 \frac{m}{s}$ with no pause time. Twenty of the nodes were CBR sources sending 4 packets per second. Details of the simulation parameters are given in table 2. These parameters are used for all following simulations.

Figure 1 shows the results of these simulations. We have varied the number of selfish nodes from 0 to 50 (the total number of nodes in the network). It is obvious that the number of selfish nodes has a significant effect on the rate of packets that are successfully delivered in the network. Further the movement rate has a clear effect. The faster nodes move, the lower the delivery ratio becomes. Finally we see that at lower speeds nodes of case 3.1 are more detrimental to the network than those of type case 1.1, whereas at higher speeds there are no big differences.

What explanations can be found for this? When the number of case-1.1 nodes rises in a




Figure 1: Selfish attack simulation

network, there are less nodes available for building up routes. So if no alternative route can be established, there is no route to the destination which means that packets have to be discarded. That reduces the delivery rate. When movement speed rises, the delivery ratio also diminishes as the network in general gets more fragile. But the network still has a reasonable chance of routing around the selfish nodes. This changes with type case-3.1. Here the nodes behave correctly during the route discovery phase. Thus they can be included in regular routes, but then they start to drop all packets. This isn't detected by DSR and no countermeasures are taken. So at a movement speed of $20 \frac{m}{s}$ only 10% of the selfish nodes push the probability of a successful packet delivery below 50%.

Our simulations with AODV have revealed a similar behavior. This demonstrates clearly that an effective protection against selfish and malicious nodes is absolutely mandatory for ad hoc networks.

2 Motivation vs. Detection & Exclusion

There are two approaches of dealing with selfish nodes. The first approach tries to give a motivation for participating in the network function. A typical system representing this approach is Nuglets by Hubeaux et al. [BH01, BH03]. The authors suggest to introduce a virtual currency called Nuglets that is earned by relaying foreign traffic and spent by sending own traffic. The major drawback of this approach is the demand for trusted hardware to secure the currency. There are arguments that tamper-resistant devices in general might be next to impossible to be realized [AK96, AK97]. A similar approach without the need of tamper-proof hardware has been suggested by Zhong et al. in [ZCY03].

Most of the existing work in this field concentrates on the second approach: detecting and excluding misbehaving nodes. The first to propose a solution to the problem of selfish (or as they call it "misbehaving") nodes in an ad hoc network were Marti, Giuli, Lai, and Baker in [MGLB00]. Their system uses a watchdog that monitors the neighboring nodes to check if they actually relay the data the way they should do. Then a component called pathrater will try to prevent paths which contain such misbehaving nodes. As they indicate in their paper, their detection mechanism has a number of severe drawbacks. Relying only on overhearing transmissions in promiscuous mode may fail due to a number of reasons. In case of sensor failure, nodes may be falsely accused of misbehavior. The second drawback is that selfish nodes profit from being recognized as misbehaving. The paths in the network are then routed around them, but there is no exclusion from service. We will later present more advanced sensors that will allow a better detection of selfish nodes.

In [ZL00, ZLH03], the authors describe a distributed intrusion detection system (IDS) for MANETs that consists of the local components "data collection", "detection" and "response", and of the global components "cooperative detection" and "global response". Their architecture is very promising and similar to the one we use in our project, but they neglect the aspect how their local data collection should find out on incidents like dropped packets, concealed links, etc.

Another system is the "Collaborative Reputation Mechanism" or CORE [MM, MM02]. It

is similar to the distributed IDS by Zhang et al. and consists of local observations that are combined and distributed to calculate a reputation value for each node. Based on this reputation, nodes are allowed to participate in the network or are excluded. In their work, the authors specify in detail how the different nodes should cooperate to combine the local reputation values to a global reputation and how they should react to negative reputations of nodes. For the actual detection of selfish nodes, they only refer to the work of Marti.

A similar approach is conducted by Buchegger et al. with their system called CONFIDANT [BB02a, BB02b]. Again, they only marginally describe their detection mechanism and rely mostly on promiscuous overhearing.

3 MobIDS

We have developed a *Mobile Intrusion Detection System (MobIDS)* that has a similar structure like some of the systems mentioned above. As you can see in figure 2, different sensors collect data from the network.

MobIDS is embedded in a secure system framework called *Security Architecture for Mobile Ad hoc Networks* or *SAM*. SAM also includes mechanisms for

- *uniquely identifying nodes* within the network. Nodes cannot change their identity or create additional identities to fool sensors.
- *secure routing* with a special routing protocol called *Secure Dynamic Source Routing (SDSR)*. Using SDSR nodes cannot alter routing data, so MobIDS does not need to detect attacks that are based on forging of valid routing data. Therefore MobIDS sensors can concentrate on the detection of selfish behavior which in turn cannot be detected by a routing protocol.
- *exchange of symmetric keys* used by some of the MobIDS sensors. This key exchange is integrated into the SDSR routing protocol, so whenever a valid route is established between two nodes, the necessary keys are exchanged in an efficient way.

Due to limited space, we cannot describe the full SAM system here. See [Ka03] for a detailed and complete description. For the rest of this text, we focus on MobIDS and its detection sensors. As you can see, data from the secure routing protocol SDSR is can also taken as input to some sensors.

The sensors generate *observations*. $\sigma_n^s \in [-1; 1]$ represents the n^{th} observation of sensor s . Positive values represent a positive behavior whereas a negative value expresses non-cooperative behavior. All local observations of a node k_i and a sensor s regarding another node k_j at time t lead to a *sensor rating* $r_{k_i}^t(k_j|s) \in [-1; 1]$:

$$r_{k_i}^t(k_j|s) = \left(\sum_{\forall n} \rho(t, t_n) \cdot \sigma_n^s \right) / n$$




Figure 2: Overview of MobIDS

where

$$\rho(t, t_n) = 1 - \left(\frac{t - t_n}{T} \right)^x$$

t_n is the time when a specific observation σ_n^s was made. The function ρ makes older observations less important than newer ones, observations older than $t - T$ are ignored and can be discarded. x controls the degradation of older observations.

Finally all sensor ratings $r_{k_i}^t(k_j|s)$ are combined into a *local rating* $r_{k_i}^t(k_j) \in [-1; 1]$ that expresses the judgment of node k_i regarding node k_j at time t :

$$r_{k_i}^t(k_j) = \sum_{\forall s} w_s \cdot r_{k_i}^t(k_j|s)$$

w_s is a weighting factor which represents the credibility of different sensors. Very reliable sensors receive a higher weight than less reliable ones.

The local ratings are then *distributed* to neighboring nodes by flooding them periodically in a certain diameter surrounding a node. A node averages all received local ratings (including his own) which results in the *global rating* $gr_{k_i}^t(k_j)$.

As the initial observations are often based on statistical sensors, no node can prove that his rating is actually accurate. So when distributing ratings, these are signed by private keys of each node, but no further attempt is made to prove the credibility of a rating. Instead, global ratings are only accepted when at least N nodes have contributed to the rating. This prevents alliances of less than N nodes from excluding other nodes from the network.

Based on the global rating, nodes may be excluded from the current network. MobIDS defines different thresholds t_t , t_e and t_r , where t_e is the *exclusion threshold*. If the rating

of a node k_i regarding a node k_j sinks below t_e , k_i will invalidate all routes containing k_j and will ignore all packets related to k_j . After some time, old negative observations will expire, so the rating of k_j will eventually increase again. As soon as the global rating exceeds the *rehabilitation threshold* t_r , k_j will be serviced again.

There is one problem: As the distribution process takes some time to deliver the local ratings to all nodes, the global ratings of different nodes regarding k_j may differ by a certain amount ϵ . If $r_{k_i}^t(k_j) < t_e < r_{k_l}^t(k_j)$ then node k_i will stop servicing k_j whereas k_l will still regard k_j as a cooperating node. So when k_i stops forwarding packets to k_j , sensors of k_l may detect this and punish k_i .

Therefore the system contains a third threshold t_t , the so-called *tolerance threshold*, where $t_e < t_r < t_t - \epsilon$. When $r_{k_l}^t(k_j)$ is below t_t , k_l will tolerate any node to deny service to k_j without deducing negative ratings from this.

In addition, the security architecture contains a mechanism that allows global exclusion of nodes from MANETs by invalidating their cryptographic identity. But this is outside the scope of this paper.

Another question is how the different thresholds should be chosen. Up to now we have adjusted them manually for each type of simulation by running different simulations and testing the results. In the final section we will outline future research on how to adjust them automatically.


It is obvious that without good sensors all the following steps (local and global rating, exclusion) will fail to deliver good results. So the rest of the paper focuses on this aspect of MobIDS.

4 Advanced Sensors

4.1 Activity-Based Overhearing

We already mentioned that there are a number of problems when a node wants to determine whether another node actually relays its packet by listening in promiscuous mode for the transmission. In promiscuous mode, a wireless network interface consumes more power than in standard mode. Furthermore, there are a lot of cases where a relay node actually forwards a packet but the node overhearing the relay node's activity will fail to realize that. If e.g. the overhearing node is currently transmitting or receiving data in a IEEE 802.11 network at a lower wirespeed (e.g. 5.5 or 2 Mbps) then it will not be able to capture transmissions that happen at other speeds. Other problems include collisions, cooperating selfish nodes, and many more.

In our new activity-based overhearing mechanism a node also tries to overhear forwarding of data packets by its next hop. But this time it only triggers an alarm when it recently saw normal traffic from this node but then detects no forwarding activity. Using this mechanism we can improve the detection accuracy significantly. Furthermore, our architecture introduces a threshold. The monitoring node will only trigger an alarm when it detects a

Figure 3: Traditional vs. Activity-based Overhearing at $1m/s$

certain number of packets being dropped within a certain timeframe.

Figure 3 shows simulation results at a movement speed of $1m/s$. It verifies the better performance of the activity-based overhearing mechanism. The left graph shows the detection rate of MobIDS in the presence of a specific number of selfish nodes that operate according to case 3.1 in the attack tree (forward routing traffic, but drop subsequent data traffic). All values are taken as the average of 10 different simulation runs. Lets assume a network with 2 selfish nodes. Then each of the two nodes is (on average) detected by 1.1 monitoring nodes using traditional overhearing. When we use activity-based overhearing there are 4.5 nodes detecting each selfish node. When the number of selfish nodes gets higher (from 5 to 10), the traditional overhearing performs better than activity-based overhearing. We can use both approaches when the results of both sensors are combined. This delivers highly acceptable results.

When the number of selfish nodes become large¹, detection rates get really bad. Only one or two nodes will detect a selfish node during the average simulation run. This is partially because we assume that selfish nodes do not act as sensors anymore. So in case of 10 selfish nodes you also have to take into consideration that 20% of the sensors are gone. In order to get good results here, we need to combine the overhearing sensor with other sensors like the probing sensor described later.

The graph on the right in figure 3 shows the false-positives that the overhearing sensors produce. Here is significant that these values are always low compared to the correct positive identifications of selfish nodes. In MobIDS, a node is excluded from the network only if a number of different nodes agree on it being selfish or malicious. So when only one node has a false-positive this has no negative effects on the detected node.

Simulations at $20m/s$ (figure 4) show that the detection rate of the activity-based and combined overhearing even increases at higher speeds. This is due to the larger number of routing protocol packets that circulate in the network. This enables the activity detector to predict more precisely whether another host is still in communication range.

¹more than 10 or 20% of all nodes!




Figure 4: Traditional vs. Activity-based Overhearing at 20m/s

4.2 Iterative Probing

In [AHNRR02] the authors describe a mechanism called *probing* to detect selfish or malicious nodes in a MANET route from source S to destination D . They use onion encryption to embed a probe command for a specific node X into normal data packets. When X decrypts its onion layer, it will find this command and send back an acknowledge packet to the source. As soon as an acknowledge is missing, S starts a binary search in the path to find out, where packets are being dropped. S simply sends probes to the selected nodes and waits for their replies. Figure 5 shows the binary search after which we call it *binary probing*.

This approach has a number of drawbacks. The onion encryption is very expensive, as each packet has to be encrypted multiple times depending on the path length. Furthermore each node has to decrypt the packet once and each packet has to be acknowledged explicitly by the recipient D .

But there is an even more severe problem. There is no reliable detection of the node dropping packets. When a selfish node gets a probe packet it can choose to forward packets for a limited time (until the probe is over) and then continue to drop packets. Even worse, depending on how the probing is realized, it may even be able to selectively drop probe packets destined for another host. This host will not acknowledge the probe and will be marked as hostile.

In our mechanism, that we call iterative probing, we use a different approach. Like in [AHNRR02] we assume that a source S has established a secret key k_{SX_i} with each node X_i ($i = 1..n - 1$) in its path to a destination X_n . There is a command field C included in the packet header that may contain a node id X_i which is encrypted by k_{SX_i} , so $C = enc_{k_{SX_i}}(X_i)$ ($i = 1..n$). Otherwise the field contains a random number. Each intermediate node X_j will now try to decrypt C . If the result is its node ID, it will send an (encrypted) probe reply packet back to S , otherwise it will process the packet as usual. So S has to encrypt only a small portion of the packet and it has to do so only once (compared to the onion-encryption approach) Intermediary nodes will only have to decrypt the small




Figure 5: Binary Probing




Figure 6: Iterative Probing

command field and not the whole packet.

In normal operation (that is while it receives packets from X_n as a reply to the packets it sent to X_n) there is no need for probing. But when S hasn't received a packet from X_n for a certain amount of time t , it will send a probe packet to X_n . If there is no reply within a certain timeout, it will send a probe to X_{n-1} and so on until it receives a reply from a node or reaches X_1 . This is called *iterative probing* and shown in figure 6.

Iterative Probing has one advantage over binary probing: a selfish node only knows of an ongoing probing when it is its turn to answer a probe. So it is not able to blame any nodes on an arbitrary position later in the path by selectively filtering out or forwarding probe packets. Instead, there are only two possibilities: it can reply to the probe or it can discard it. All later probe packets are sent to nodes earlier in the path and cannot be manipulated any more. But there is still one problem remaining.

Let X_j be the first node from which S receives an acknowledge. There are two possibilities now. Either is X_{j+1} the selfish node dropping all packets. In this case X_{j+1} is also dropping probe packets and X_j is working properly. Or X_j is the selfish node dropping packets. But before dropping a packet, X_j checks if it is a probe addressed to himself. In order to be harder to detect, X_j will then reply to the probe.

So albeit the iterative probing sensor is harder to fail than the binary probing, it cannot distinguish which of the two nodes is actually the malicious one. We call this problem the




Figure 7: X_2 answers probes: possible selfish nodes $\{X_2, X_3\}$




Figure 8: X_2 answers not: possible selfish nodes $\{X_1, X_2\}$

probing dilemma. In the next section we will present an approach to prevent this. But first we give an analysis of the iterative probing.

Figure 9 (left side) shows the simulation results for the iterative probing sensor facing the standard adversary – a selfish case-3.1 node. Even for 10 selfish nodes we still have an average of 4.9 nodes detecting each selfish node. The false-positives are negligibly low. So probing is an efficient way of detecting selfish nodes.

4.3 Unambiguous-Probing

As indicated above, the probing techniques described so far face a serious problem: probing can not unambiguously detect a selfish node. Even worse, the standard probing described in [AHNRR02] allows a malicious node to make another arbitrary node look selfish. Our iterative-probing can narrow the potential adversary nodes down to two nodes. In order to clearly identify one of these nodes as being responsible for the dropped data packets, we can combine the iterative probing with overhearing. Let X_j and X_{j+1} be the nodes that are suspicious of dropping packets like described above. Now we can verify if X_j is dropping the packet by asking X_{j-1} to check if he can overhear the forwarding of a




Figure 9: Iterative Probing and exclusion of selfish nodes

following probe packet by node X_j . If this probe fails and X_{j-1} can't hear X_j forwarding the packet, then it is very likely that X_j is dropping the packets, otherwise X_{j+1} is the node responsible for the packet drop.

4.4 Overall Detection Rate

MobIDS combines all presented sensors in order to make a decision on excluding nodes from the network. Our simulation results show that the detection of misbehaving nodes is very accurate and we have practically no false accusations. Figure 9 (right side) shows the percentage of discovered and excluded selfish nodes at different movement speeds. In this scenario, three different nodes were needed to detect another node as selfish in order to exclude it from the network. In the simulations, we used combined-overhearing, unambiguous-probing and route-request scanning sensors in parallel. The last sensor was not presented here due to space limitations. It takes information from the routing protocol and detects nodes that are not forwarding route requests properly. As you can see, up to about 5 selfish nodes, all were detected and excluded reliably. At around 10 selfish nodes, detection rate drops below 50%. As we have already discussed in the section on overhearing sensors, 10 selfish nodes are actually 20% of all nodes. As these nodes do not work as sensors, i.e. they do not contribute to the MobIDS detection system, it is obvious that detection results get worse. So MobIDS requires the consensus of a significant majority of all nodes that they want to cooperate and form an ad hoc network. Given that, detection of a few selfish nodes is very reliable.

5 Conclusion and Future Work

As we have seen, the construction of sensors to detect selfish or malicious nodes in ad hoc networks is a complex task. In this paper we have presented a number of different sensors that can detect different kinds of selfish nodes with a good confidence as shown in our

simulation results. If multiple sensors are active in parallel and a selfish node is detected by a number of these sensors, then this is a good indication for excluding the node from the network.

One remaining problem with our current simulations is that all thresholds need to be set manually in order to get good detection results. So in the future we will try to find ways how these values can be set and adjusted automatically during operation. Possible candidates might be some kind of an adjustment algorithm or a self-learning system using neural networks. Furthermore we plan to develop and test additional sensors that will e.g. use topology information from the routing protocol in order to detect selfish nodes.

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