

Reproducing Taint-Analysis Results with ReproDroid

Felix Pauck,¹ Eric Bodden,² Heike Wehrheim³

Abstract:

More and more Android taint-analysis tools appear each year. Any paper proposing such a tool typically comes with an in-depth evaluation of its supported features, accuracy and ability to be applied on real-world apps. Although the authors spent a lot of effort to come up with these evaluations, comparability is often hindered since the description of their experimental targets is usually limited.

To conduct a comparable, automatic and unbiased evaluation of different analysis tools, we propose the framework `REPRODROID`. The framework enables us to precisely declare our evaluation targets, in consequence we refine three well-known benchmarks: `DROIDBENCH`, `ICC-BENCH` and `DIALDROID-BENCH`. Furthermore, we instantiate this framework for six prominent taint-analysis tools, namely `AMANDROID`, `DIALDROID`, `DIDFAIL`, `DROIDSAFE`, `FLOWDROID` and `ICCTA`. Finally, we use these instances to automatically check whether different promises commonly made in the associated proposing papers are kept.

Keywords: Android Taint Analysis; Tools; Benchmarks; Empirical Studies; Reproducibility

1 The `REPRODROID` Study

Figure 1 depicts the conceptual idea behind our Android benchmark reproduction framework `REPRODROID`, which helps to (i) precisely specify the ground-truth of benchmarks and allows to (ii) automatically execute and (iii) evaluate benchmarks. First, the app-set representing a certain benchmark must be loaded into `REPRODROID`. In a semi-automatic manner the ground-truth can then be specified for the associated apps. Effectively a list of precisely defined sources, sinks and expected flows between them is generated this way. A *refined* benchmark, for which such a list exists, can be stored and reused anytime without having to redo this first refinement step. Once a refined benchmark becomes available in `REPRODROID` an arbitrary analysis tool can automatically be executed for each benchmark case. In order to do so, only



Fig. 1: Overview of ReproDroid

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¹ Paderborn University, Warburger Str. 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany fpauck@mail.uni-paderborn.de

² Paderborn University, Warburger Str. 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany eric.bodden@uni-paderborn.de

³ Paderborn University, Warburger Str. 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany wehrheim@uni-paderborn.de

REPRODROID's configuration needs to be adapted to suit the designated analysis tool. In the end, results produced this way are collected and automatically compared against the beforehand specified ground-truth.

In our evaluation we took a look at three different categories of promises given in the proposing papers considering AMANDROID [We14], DIALDROID [Bo17], DIDFAIL [Kl14], DROID-SAFE [Go15], FLOWDROID [Ar14] and ICCTA [Li15]. The first type of evaluated promises (*feature-promises*) considers the features and sensitivities which are claimed to be supported by these six tools. Second, *accuracy-promises* are checked by attempting to reproduce the F-measure values reported (+/- 0.2) for certain benchmarks or subsets. The authors of the papers associated with all six tools promise that their tool is real world ready. Thus, lastly we checked these *real-world-promises*. Table 2 shows the number of promises given and how many could not be confirmed per category – a verbose version of these results is available in [PBW18]. As we can see, only a minority of promises cannot be confirmed. Nonetheless, the accuracy-promises are not strictly kept and in particular the real-world-promises are not fully kept by any tool.

Promises	Given / Unconfirmed	
Feature	64	5
Accuracy	12	6
Real-World	6	6

Fig. 2: Evaluation results

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