Araujo, RobertoSimplicio, MarcosCominetti, EduardoMatias, PauloTraoré, JacquesVolkamer, MelanieDuenas-Cid, DavidRønne, Peter B.Budurushi, JurlindBlom, MichelleRodriguez Pérez, AdriàSpycher-Krivonosova, IuliiaMartin-Rozumilowicz, BeataSpycher, Oliver2025-02-142025-02-142024https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/45863A few voting schemes for polling station elections are end-to-end (E2E) verifiable, allowing voters to check if their choices were cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast. Some solutions rely on the Benaloh challenge, through which voters can spoil their ballots to verify if they were encrypted properly. In this paper, we discuss two potential issues and mitigations when this technique is used for in person voting with direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines: (1) leakage of voters' intentions in some scenarios; and (2) malicious DRE machines gathering statistical data aiming to trick challengers.enElectronic VotingE2EBenaloh challengeDREText/Conference Paper10.18420/e-vote-id2024_041617-5468