Hörnemann, JanPohlmann, NorbertUrban, TobiasGroße-Kampmann, MatteoWendzel, SteffenWressnegger, ChristianHartmann, LauraFreiling, FelixArmknecht, FrederikReinfelder, Lena2024-04-192024-04-192024978-3-88579-739-5https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/43954In this paper, we shed light on shared hosting services’ security and trust implications and measure their attack surfaces. To do so, we analyzed 30 shared hosters and found that all of them might leak relevant information, which could be abused unnoticed. An adversary could use this attack surface to covertly extract data from various third parties registered with a shared hoster. Furthermore, we found that most hosters suffer from vulnerabilities that can be used by an internal attacker (i.e., someone using the service) to compromise other hosted services or the entire system.enSharing is Caring: Towards Analyzing Attack Surfaces on Shared Hosting ProvidersText/Conference Paper10.18420/sicherheit2024_0141617-5468