Röpke, ChristianLangweg, HannoMeier, MichaelWitt, Bernhard C.Reinhardt, Delphine2018-03-222018-03-222018978-3-88579-675-6https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/16297An SDN controller is a core component of the SDN architecture. It is responsible for managing an underlying network while allowing SDN applications to program it as required. Because of this central role, compromising such an SDN controller is of high interest for an attacker. A recently published SDN rootkit has demonstrated, for example, that a malicious SDN application is able to manipulate an entire network while hiding corresponding malicious actions. However, the facts that this attack targeted an open source SDN controller and applied a specific way to subvert this system leaves important questions unanswered: How easy is it to attack closed source SDN controllers in the same way? Can we concentrate on the already presented technique or do we need to consider other attack vectors as well to protect SDN controllers? In this paper, we elaborate on these research questions and present two new SDN rootkits, both targeting a closed source SDN controller. Similar to previous work, the first one is based on Java reflection. In contrast to known reflection abuses, however, we must develop new techniques as the existing ones can only be adopted in parts. Additionally, we demonstrate by a second SDN rootkit that an attacker is by no means limited to reflection-based attacks. In particular, we abuse aspect-oriented programming capabilities to manipulate core functions of the targeted system. To tackle the security issues raised in this case study, we discuss several countermeasures and give concrete suggestions to improve SDN controller security.enSoftware-defined networkingSDN controller securitySDN rootkitsText/Conference Paper10.18420/sicherheit2018_071617-5468