Wei, ShoukeGnauck, AlbrechtHryniewicz, OlgierdStudzinski, JanRomaniuk, Maciej2019-09-162019-09-162007https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/27623The management of reservoirs is very complex, and it is usually involved with multi-users. Conflicts usually arise between multi-users due to their competing for water use. Game theoretic models and notions can be applied to model such problems and find solutions. In this paper, water quality management of Danjiangkou Reservoir in Hanjiang River Basin in China is analyzed and modeled as a game. The results show that non-cooperation will result in a prisoner’s dilemma and exacerbate the deterioration of water quality. For the case of Danjiangkou Reservoir, compensation is proposed as the best solution to solve the prisoner’s dilemma.Text/Conference Paper