McEvoy, Thomas RichardWolthusen, StephenGöbel, OliverFrings, SandraGünther, DetlefNedon, JensSchadt, Dirk2019-06-042019-06-042008978-3-88579-234-5https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/23598Detecting malicious software used for covert ends is problematical because skilled attackers invariably employ stealth mechanisms to conceal the injection and subsequent activity of such software. As a result, the evidence of such incursions, frequently "disappears" once the attack has succeeded. In distributed environments, this difficulty is compounded because of the inherent difficulties in observing the global state of a computation. We propose a novel approach to the detection of potentially malicious activity in distributed environments. We select key data elements, which are chosen on the basis that they are frequently subject to subversion during malicious attacks. We specify their behavior as a partial order of sequences in state, accounting not only for legal and illegal states, but also for less than normative behavior, whose occurrence may indicate the presence of anomalous conditions. We show how we overcome the difficulties of observing state in distributed environments through employing a multiplicity of distinct and independent observer processes and by making use of well-known algorithms to synchronize and order our observations and we demonstrate that we are able to use the resulting data set to make inferences about the presence (or not) of malicious software based on comparisons of observed and expected behaviors.enText/Conference Paper1617-5468