Kakizaki, KazuyaMiyagawa, TaikiSingh, InderjeetSakuma, JunBrömme, ArslanBusch, ChristophDamer, NaserDantcheva, AntitzaGomez-Barrero, MartaRaja, KiranRathgeb, ChristianSequeira, AnaUhl, Andreas2021-10-042021-10-042021978-3-88579-709-8https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/37446DNN-based face verification systems are vulnerable to adversarial examples. The previous paper's evaluation protocol (scenario), which we called the probe-dependent attack scenario, was unrealistic. We define a more practical attack scenario, the probe-agnostic attack. We empirically show that these attacks are more challenging than probe-dependent ones. We propose a simple and effective method, PAMTAM, to improve the attack success rate for probe-agnostic attacks. We show that PAMTAM successfully improves the attack success rate in a wide variety of experimental settings.enAdversarial exampleFace verificationSecurityToward Practical Adversarial Attacks on Face Verification SystemsText/Conference Paper1617-5468