Akinalp, CoskunUnger, HerwigEichler, GeraldKüpper, AxelSchau, VolkmarFouchal, HacèneUnger, HerwigEichler, GeraldKüpper, AxelSchau, VolkmarFouchal, HacèneUnger, Herwig2019-01-112019-01-112011978-3-88579-280-2https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/18997The performance of networks is usually linked to network-related aspects such as bandwidth and protocols. However, behind every network element there are users who may organize their relations to others. But which organizational structures are successful for individuals and groups and how can the data traffic be optimized for network infrastructure? By means of a network creation game, this paper examines the results of different network structures and compares individual decisions to grouping behaviours. The experiments were simulated in the form of a ring network which enables individual nodes to create long links (direct connections between nodes) to other nodes based on their account values. For one group within the network, an extended approach was tested, i.e. there was the option of having the behaviours of decentralized”democracy” or centralized-hierarchical”kingdom” organizations? manage the long links within the group. The results of the simulations for different power law distributions of messages show that cooperation within the structures, compared to the individual node, differ in terms of routing steps, account values and the stable management of long links. We find that the hierarchical approach represents successful network transactions for different grouping sizes.enText/Conference Paper1617-5468