They’re not that hard to mitigate: What Cryptographic Library Developers Think About Timing Attacks

Jancar, JanFourné, MarcelDe Almeida Braga, DanielSabt, MohamedSchwabe, PeterBarthe, GillesFouque, Pierre-AlainAcar, YaseminRabiser, RickWimmer, ManuelGroher, IrisWortmann, AndreasWiesmayr, Bianca2024-02-192024-02-192024978-3-88579-737-1https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/43592enThey’re not that hard to mitigate: What Cryptographic Library Developers Think About Timing AttacksText/Conference Paper10.18420/sw2024_471617-5468