P347: E-Vote-ID 2023 - Eight International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting
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- TextdokumentGerman Social Elections in 2023(E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Hilt, Tobias; Kulyk, Oksana; Volkamer, MelanieIn 2023, the third largest election in German, the social elections (in German Sozialwahlen), offered an online channel for the first time. Of particular interest is the fact that the system provides a form of cast-as-intended verifiability, allowing the voter to verify that their vote was cast as intended and not manipulated by the device they used to cast their vote. This paper describes a first analysis of the overall voter experience with a special focus on this verifiability functionality. We utilize a cognitive walkthrough method, with three people having different levels of expertise regarding online voting, including a layman, a security expert, and a voting expert. Our findings reveal a number of issues with the system in terms of communication and presented information, and highlight areas in need of improvement to enhance user experience in particular with respect to the verifiability functionality.
- TextdokumentSwiss Online Voting Redesigned(E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Spycher, OliverSwitzerland is one of the few countries with a strong record in online voting in national elections and votes. After 15 years during which parts of the electorate cast their vote online, the trials were brought to a halt in 2019. This short-paper summarizes the developments in Swiss online voting since 2019, when the trial framework was redesigned, allowing trials to take place again in 2023. This article is a non-scientific contribution aimed at providing the e-voting community with essential background information on Swiss online voting. Thereby it sets a focus on the new role of academia in the trial phase.
- TextdokumentSetting international standards on digital election technologies(E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Rodríguez-Pérez, Adrià; Barrat Esteve, JordiIn recent years, there has been a surge of international standards on digital election technologies: recommendations, guidelines, compendiums, etc. Whereas the legal character of some of these instruments may be put into question, there is no doubt that they prescribe certain good or ideal behaviour that electoral stakeholders should follow when digital technologies are introduced in electoral processes. This paper aims at taking stock of the development of these standards, assessing their degree of legalization, and mapping the stakeholders behind these standard-setting efforts. With this goal in mind, up to 37 international standards on digital election technologies are first identified. These standards deal with issues ranging from broader concerns about the introduction of digital technologies in elections and its compliance with international obligations to the observation and procurement of digital election technologies, as well as with cybersecurity and data protection issues. We are able to demonstrate that although these standards are (still) far from creating an international regime on digital election technologies, they do share many things in common: low levels of obligation and delegation, but high levels of precision that help complement actual hard-law instruments in the electoral field. Second, the paper discusses if the development of these standards can be framed in the context of the Governance Triangle and/or the institution of multi-stakeholderism. Far from what is seen in other areas of global and Internet governance, cooperation between different types of international actors is currently limited: most of the standards being either developed by States, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) independently.
- TextdokumentTrust Frameworks in Application to Technology in Elections(E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Duenas-Cid, David; Loeber, Leontine; Martin-Rozumiłowicz, Beata; Macias, RyanThe prevalence of technology in elections has increased in recent decades, both in terms of voting systems as well as ancillary ones. At the same time, the issue of public confidence and trust has come to the fore as certain threat actors have sought to undermine electoral integrity through publicized attacks and disinformation campaigns against such technology. This paper examines the nexus between this public trust and the implementation of technology through an electoral cycle approach. It also presents a number of case studies at various points of democratic development and election management body type to examine how various trust variables impact implementation to either increase trust or distrust. This is done to better understand the directionality of these criteria through a methodologically driven approach, based on a uniquely developed trust model. It is hoped that this study will help experts to better understand how these variables impact the critical trust that underpins robust democratic institutions.
- TextdokumentCoercion-resistant i-voting with short PIN and OAuth 2.0(E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Bitussi, M.; Longo, R.; Marino, F. Antonio; Morelli, U.; Sharif, A.; Spadafora, C.; Tomasi, A.This paper presents an architecture for an OAuth 2.0-based i-voting solution using a mobile native client in a variant of the Araújo-Traoré protocol. We follow a systematic approach by identifying relevant OAuth 2.0 specifications and best practices. Having defined our framework, we identify threats applicable to our proposed methodology and detail how our design mitigates them to provide a safer i-voting process.
- TextdokumentVoter Perception of Cast-as-Intended Verifiability(E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Hilt, Tobias; Sein, Kati; Mällo, Tanel; Willemson, Jan; Volkamer, MelanieThe internet voting protocol deployed at Estonian political elections was enhanced by cast-as-intended vote verifyability mechanism in 2013 to reveal manipulations of the vote casting device by using a second device (most likely a mobile device as it needs to be euqipped with a camera). This paper studies voters' perception and comprehension of this mobile-device-based cast-as-intended verifiability mechanism. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 13 eligible voters who have cast an electronic vote at least once since the availability of this mechanism. While most participants were in favor of having the option to verify available, most were not aware of the main purpose to verify. Instead, they, for instance, thought it was designed to check that they had not made a mistake while selecting a candidate or to verify one's vote was tallied as intended. Thus, our findings highlight the need for improved communication on cast-as-intended verifiability in order to enable informed decisions whether to verify or not.
- TextdokumentE-Vote-ID 2023: Eight International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting(E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Pointcheval, David; Haenni, Rolf; Kořánová, Ilona Starý; Aranha, Diego F.; Battagliola, Michele; Roy, Lawrence; Bitussi, M.; Longo, R.; Marino, F. Antonio; Morelli, U.; Sharif, A.; Spadafora, C.; Tomasi, A.; Erb, Yannick; Duenas-Cid, David; Volkamer, Melanie; Serrano Iova, Radu Antonio; Duenas-Cid, David; Loeber, Leontine; Martin-Rozumiłowicz, Beata; Macias, Ryan; Rodríguez-Pérez, Adrià; Costa, Núria; Finogina, Tamara; Esseiva, Olivier; Høgåsen, Audhild; Monnat, Xavier; Cortier, Véronique; Gaudry, Pierrick; Glondu, Stéphane; Ruhault, Sylvain; Hilt, Tobias; Sein, Kati; Mällo, Tanel; Willemson, Jan; Hilt, Tobias; Kulyk, Oksana; Glazer, Amanda K.; Spertus, Jacob V.; Stark, Philip B.; Spycher, Oliver; Barrat Esteve, Jordi
- TextdokumentImproving the Swiss Post Voting System(E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Esseiva, Olivier; Høgåsen, Audhild; Monnat, XavierThe Swiss Post Voting System has undergone over the past few years a rigorous independent examination by experts mandated by the Swiss Federal Chancellery. Following the examination, Swiss Post has made improvements in several areas, including for voter authentication, synchronization, input validation, and universal verifiability. On 18 June 2023, the Swiss Post Voting System was put to trial in its first productive election event. 4,239 voters cast their vote online during the approximately one month that the e-voting channel was open. The adoption rate of the e-voting channel was high, especially among Swiss residents living abroad, with an adoption rate of more than 50%. Swiss Post extensively monitored the voting servers during the whole election period and did not detect any anomalies during the system's operation. The feedback collected regarding the voters' user experience was largely positive. A few voters experienced confusion with regard to the voting process or with browser compatibility issues. Swiss Post has learned important lessons from the independent examination and from the first productive election event, and will continue the work improving the Swiss Post Voting System.
- TextdokumentRegulating for the “known unknowns” in i-voting(E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Rodríguez-Pérez, Adrià; Costa, Núria; Finogina, TamaraQuantum computing is yet another example of the shift towards governance and policy-making amidst uncertain risks. We know it is coming and we anticipate that it will have a huge impact on today's electronic communications: the underlaying mathematical problems that allow us to securely send an email, shop online or transfer money are at stake. Voting online will no longer be secure either. In this paper we address a more fundamental concern: how the technological developments in quantum computing tomorrow may affect the fundamental rights of people voting online today. Internet voting is being progressively adopted in many electoral processes, including governmental ones. Countries like Canada, Estonia, France and Switzerland often use it. Their systems satisfy the legal requirements for democratic elections today, but they will no longer be secure once quantum computers are used to break the underlying mathematical problems behind public key cryptography. Our claim in this paper is that this is not only a problem for future regulations, but today's secret ballots are already vulnerable to quantum cryptanalysis in the future (i.e., retrospective decryption). Despite governments and electoral administrations being aware of this risk, no specific measures are yet being adopted to mitigate it, as our analysis of the electoral regulations in the above-mentioned countries shows. Interestingly, there is already a set of alternatives that could be studied. In this paper we analyze several proposals that aim at providing long-term privacy in Internet voting, including secure data deletion, quantum-resistant cryptosystems, and anonymous voting. Whereas none of these alternatives is a silver bullet against quantum cryptanalysis, it is essential that their feasibility is studied so that technological developments do not harm citizen's fundamental rights.
- TextdokumentStylish Risk-Limiting Audits in Practice(E-Vote-ID 2023, 2023) Glazer, Amanda K.; Spertus, Jacob V.; Stark, Philip B.Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) can use information about which ballot cards contain which contests (card-style data, CSD) to ensure that each contest receives adequate scrutiny, without examining more cards than necessary. RLAs using CSD in this way can be substantially more efficient than RLAs that sample indiscriminately from all cast cards. We describe an open-source Python implementation of RLAs using CSD for the Hart InterCivic Verity voting system and the Dominion Democracy Suite voting system. The software is demonstrated using all 181 contests in the 2020 general election and all 214 contests in the 2022 general election in Orange County, CA, USA, the fifth-largest election jurisdiction in the U.S., with over 1.8 million active voters. (Orange County uses the Hart Verity system.) To audit the 181 contests in 2020 to a risk limit of 5% without using CSD would have required a complete hand tally of all 3,094,308 cast ballot cards. With CSD, the estimated sample size is about 20,100 cards, 0.65% of the cards cast—including one tied contest that required a complete hand count. To audit the 214 contests in 2022 to a risk limit of 5% without using CSD would have required a complete hand tally of all 1,989,416 cast cards. With CSD, the estimated sample size is about 62,250 ballots, 3.1% of cards cast—including three contests with margins below 0.1% and 9 with margins below 0.5%.