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The peasants are revoting, sire, and at random times
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2024
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Gesellschaft für Informatik
Zusammenfassung
Inspired by how coercion happens in practice in complex social networks where weak ties are more important than unilateral force, we propose a new mitigation mechanism based on revoting: adding an extra revoting period of random duration. Not only does this add opportunities to resist coercion, it also adds friction to the system, increasing the costs for both coerced voter and coercer, and disincentivising coercion. We investigate generalisations and variants of this mechanism in different frameworks (such as with and without shareable credentials), considering the optimal strategies for the electoral authority, voters and coercer. We also propose an implementation of the mechanism in a simple setting.