Universally verifiable efficient re-encryption mixnet
| dc.contributor.author | Puiggalí Allepuz, Jordi | |
| dc.contributor.author | Guasch Castelló, Sandra | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Krimmer, Robert | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Grimm, Rüdiger | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-01-17T10:25:05Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-01-17T10:25:05Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Implementing a transparent audit process when an election is conducted by electronic means is of paramount importance. Universally verifiable mixnets are focused on providing such a property by means of cryptographic proofs verifiable by any auditor. While some of these systems require high amount of computing resources that make them inefficient for real elections, others proposals reduce the computation cost by sacrificing audit accuracy or reducing the voter privacy protection level. In this paper, we propose an efficient mixnet verification system that combines the advantages of the RPC and Optimistic Mixing techniques, achieving a high audit accuracy level while fully preserving voters' privacy. | en |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-3-88579-261-1 | |
| dc.identifier.pissn | 1617-5468 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19496 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | 4th International Conference on Electronic Voting 2010 | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI) - Proceedings, Volume P-167 | |
| dc.title | Universally verifiable efficient re-encryption mixnet | en |
| dc.type | Text/Conference Paper | |
| gi.citation.endPage | 254 | |
| gi.citation.publisherPlace | Bonn | |
| gi.citation.startPage | 241 | |
| gi.conference.date | July 21st-24th, 2010 | |
| gi.conference.location | Bregenz, Austria | |
| gi.conference.sessiontitle | Regular Research Papers |
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